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ABSTRACT
During the last two decades, the treatment of infertility has improved dramatically.  These treatments,
however, are expensive and rarely covered by insurance, leading many states to adopt regulations
mandating that health insurers cover them.  In this paper, we explore the effects of benefit mandates
on the utilization and outcomes of infertility treatments.  We find that use of infertility treatments is
significantly greater in states adopting comprehensive versions of these mandates.  While greater utilization
had little impact on the number of deliveries, mandated coverage was associated with a relatively large
increase in the probability of a multiple birth.  For relatively low fertility patients who responded to
the expanded insurance coverage, treatment was often unsuccessful and did not result in a live birth.
 For relatively high fertility patients, in contrast, treatment often led to a multiple, rather than a singleton,
birth.  We also find evidence that the beneficial effects on the intensive treatment margin that have
been proposed in other studies are relatively small.  We conclude that, while benefit mandates potentially
solve a problem of adverse selection in this market, these benefits must be weighed against the costs
of the significant moral hazard in utilization they induce.
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I.  Introduction 
Mandating that employers provide certain benefits to their workers can be an 
attractive way for governments to achieve policy goals.  In the case of health insurance, 
mandates exist primarily as regulations requiring insurers to cover specified services in 
the policies they sell.  Because most people with health insurance obtain it through an 
employer, mandating that private insurers cover particular benefits compels employers 
who offer health insurance to purchase coverage for those services.
1  Over time, state 
governments and, on occasion, the Federal government have adopted mandates covering 
a wide range of services (Laugesen, Paul et al. 2006).   
The most compelling economic argument for health insurance benefit mandates is 
that they mitigate problems of adverse selection for particular types of services (McGuire 
and Montgomery 1982; Summers 1989).  When asymmetric information exists between 
insurers and consumers, a situation frequently encountered in health care, competitive 
insurance markets may fail to provide optimal levels of coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz 
1976).  Mandated provision can remedy this.  Against the potential welfare gains of 
benefit mandates, however, weigh the possible negative welfare effects.  In the case of 
health insurance, mandates may exacerbate moral hazard, leading to inefficiently high 
consumption of the mandated service (Gruber 1992).   
Existing empirical literature provides mixed evidence on the efficiency 
implications of health insurance benefit mandates.  For maternity benefits, state and 
federal mandates appear to have addressed a market failure due to adverse selection 
without generating significant moral hazard (Gruber 1994).  The mandates dramatically 
                                                 
1The well known exception is that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
exempts employers who self-insure from this type of regulation.   2
expanded insurance coverage, with employers passing on the costs of the mandated 
benefit to the workers most likely to benefit from expanded coverage.  The wage offset, 
in turn, had no impact on the labor supply of affected workers, indicating that their value 
of the incremental coverage exceeded the cost. 
Other studies provide a less positive picture of the efficiency implications of 
benefit mandates, consistent with the view that mandate passage may represent the 
preferences of particular interest groups (e.g. Stigler 1971) rather than the attempts of 
regulators to increase social welfare.  Some studies have found that benefit mandates 
negatively affect both insurance and labor markets (Jensen and Gabel 1992; Sloan and 
Conover 1998; Jensen and Morrisey 1999), suggesting that they generate moral hazard 
that offsets any welfare gains.  A third group of studies, however, reports that mandates 
of even high cost benefits have not had negative effects on either health insurance or 
labor markets.  These studies suggest that employers often provide mandated benefits 
even in the absence of a mandate (Gruber 1992; Kaestner and Simon 2002).  In this case, 
mandates neither alleviate adverse selection nor create moral hazard.   
In this paper, we investigate the impact of mandates requiring health insurers to 
provide coverage for infertility treatments.  Over the last three decades, new technologies 
have transformed the treatment of infertility.  Among the most significant advances has 
been the development of assisted reproductive therapies (ART) in which a physician 
surgically removes an egg from a woman, combines the egg with sperm in a laboratory, 
and returns the developing embryo to a woman’s body.
2  In vitro fertilization (IVF), in 
                                                 
2 The development of drugs that stimulate ovulation in women was also an important advance in the 
treatment of infertility.  Patients often use these drugs in ART cycles as well as on their own or with 
intrauterine (or artificial) insemination.    3
which the embryo is returned to the woman’s uterus, is the most common type of ART.
3  
The use of infertility treatments, particularly ART, increased rapidly during the last two 
decades.  The first delivery using ART in the U.S. occurred in 1981.  By 2004, 411 
clinics performed 127,977 cycles leading to 36,760 births of 49,458 infants (CDC 2006). 
An important concern in the treatment of infertility is its association with high 
rates of multiple births.  In IVF, patients and physicians decide how many embryos to 
return to the uterus.  While transferring more embryos increases the likelihood of a 
pregnancy, it also increases the likelihood of a multiple birth (Thurin, Hausken et al. 
2004).  More than 90% of patients transfer more than one embryo in given cycle, and 
approximately one-third of ART deliveries are multiple births compared to about 3% of 
all births (CDC 2005; Martin, Hamilton et al. 2005).  The use of ovulation-inducing 
drugs, even in the absence of ART, generates similar concerns.  Approximately one-third 
of the dramatic increase in multiple birth rates during the last three decades was due to 
increased use of reproductive technologies (CDC 2000).   
Infertility treatment offers an intriguing case of the potential the trade-off between 
solving a problem of adverse selection and creating a problem of moral hazard as a 
consequence of a benefit mandate.  Adverse selection is likely to be a problem in this 
market.  Treatment, particularly ART, is expensive.  A single cycle of IVF costs 
approximately $10,000 (Neumann and Johannesson 1994; Collins 2001).  Because many 
cycles do not result in a live birth, the average cost per delivery is over $50,000 (Collins 
2001).  The uncertain incidence of infertility and the high cost of treatment make it a 
                                                 
3 Other types of ART include gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) and zygote intrafallopian transfer 
(ZIFT), in which either unfertilized eggs and sperm (gametes) or fertilized eggs (zygotes) are placed in the 
fallopian tubes.  While GIFT and ZIFT were used in the early 1990s, they represented less than 1% of ART 
cycles in 2003 (CDC 2005).   4
significant financial risk, and experimental evidence suggests that people highly value 
insurance against this risk (Neumann and Johannesson 1994).  However, people are likely 
to have private information about both their fertility and their desire for children that is 
highly predictive of their utilization.  Because health insurance enrollment decisions are 
generally made annually, individuals are able to use this information when purchasing 
insurance, potentially leading to adverse selection.   
The fact that infertility is rarely covered by insurance is consistent with, although 
not direct evidence of, adverse selection in this market.  Although data on insurance 
coverage of infertility treatments are limited, a 1997 Mercer Consulting employer survey 
found that 65% of employers did not cover any infertility services and, of those that 
covered some, less than half provided coverage for the most expensive treatments like 
IVF.  If the absence of insurance coverage for infertility treatments signals the existence 
of adverse selection in this market, a benefit mandate may be a useful regulatory solution.  
In practice, a number of states enacted mandates requiring insurers to cover infertility 
treatments during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and Louisiana, New Jersey, and New 
York passed legislation as recently as 2001.   
In our analysis, we focus on the moral hazard effects of mandated coverage for 
infertility treatments.  Our key contribution is that we demonstrate that, not only did 
expanding insurance coverage increase utilization of ART, but that the coverage 
expansions had heterogeneous effects on the population of women of child-bearing age.  
We demonstrate that, in theory, both relatively low and relatively high fertility patients 
may respond to a reduction in the price of infertility treatments.  The effects on outcomes, 
however, are likely to differ between these groups.  For relatively low fertility couples,   5
greater utilization is likely to lead to unsuccessful cycles.  For relatively high fertility 
couples, in contrast, greater utilization of fertility treatments may lead to higher rates of 
multiple births without a corresponding increase in birth rates.  Using mother’s age as a 
proxy for fertility, we provide empirical evidence consistent with these types of effects. 
Our focus on the heterogeneous treatment effects both differentiates our study 
from other research on the effects of these mandates and provides important insights into 
the interpretation of the findings of existing studies.  Hamilton and McManus (2005) 
examine the impact of benefit mandates as well as competition among fertility clinics on 
utilization of ART and multiple birth risk.  While they conclude that mandates reduce 
multiple birth risk by changing the financial incentives influencing embryo transfer 
decisions, our results provide evidence of an alternative mechanism for their findings – 
that the reduction in multiple birth rates associated with expanded coverage reflects 
changes in the composition of the treated population.  While Bitler and Schmidt (2007) 
document higher rates of utilization of reproductive therapies in states with insurance 
mandates, particularly among older, highly-educated women, they do not link increased 
utilization to outcomes, which is necessary for evaluating the welfare implications of 
greater utilization.   
Bitler (2006), who examines differences in health outcomes among twins in states 
with and without mandates, documents that mandates lead to higher rates of twinning and 
that twins born in mandated states have slightly worse health outcomes, suggesting a 
negative effect of either ART treatment or patient selection into ART on infant health.  
Our results provide evidence on how patient selection is likely to affect the interpretation 
of results based on this identification strategy.  In particular, we propose that the marginal   6
patient in an analysis of the effects of expanded insurance coverage on rates of twinning 
is likely to represent a relatively fertile patient (among ART births), suggesting that any 
negative effects of patient selection into ART on health outcomes could be larger among 
the broader population.   
Schmidt (2007) documents higher rates of first births among women 35 and older 
in states adopting infertility mandates.  As an analysis of the moral hazard associated 
with this type of benefit mandate, however, this study has significant limitations.  We 
demonstrate that, because infertility treatments are often used for couples experiencing 
secondary infertility, restricting the analysis to first births misses important effects of 
utilization on outcomes, particularly among older women. More importantly, because the 
study does not examine rates of multiple births, it does not capture a key dimension of the 
heterogeneity of the treatment effect – whether insurance coverage leads some women to 
have a multiple rather than a singleton birth.  Using a separate data source, we also 
analyze outcomes among those treated to determine whether mandates result in 
incremental utilization that does not ultimately result in a birth and, thus, would not be 
captured by the population birth data.   
Finally, while not the focus of our study, our results provide some indirect 
evidence on whether benefit mandates cause women to delay child birth by reducing the 
price of infertility treatment (Buckles 2006).   
While each of these studies examines an important aspect of extending insurance 
coverage for the treatment of infertility, none provides evidence on how the mandates 
affect the composition of the treated population.  Yet, we demonstrate that understanding 
these heterogeneous treatment effects is essential for evaluating the welfare effects of   7
expanded coverage.  In our discussion, we reconcile our findings with those of the 
existing literature and identify their implications for research and policy.           
 
II.  Theoretical Effects of Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment 
Effect of Insurance Coverage on Utilization along the Extensive Margin 
By reducing the price of treatment, insurance coverage may increase demand for 
infertility services, resulting in greater utilization among those for whom the expected 
benefits of treatment are lower.  Patients responding to the lower price may include both 
relatively low and relatively high fertility patients.  Figure 1 plots a hypothetical 
relationship between a couple’s fertility and birth probabilities with and without 
treatment.  Treatment has the largest effect on the probability of a birth for couples in the 
middle of the fertility distribution.  Lower fertility patients are unlikely to have a birth 
without treatment and treatment generates a relatively small increase in that probability.  
Although the treatment effect is also relatively small for high fertility patients, they are 
likely to have a birth even in the absence of treatment.   
In Figure 1, L and H represent the fertility thresholds for patients seeking 
treatment in the absence of insurance coverage.  The expected benefits of treatment 
exceed the expected costs only for couples with fertility greater than L and less than H.  
A reduction in the out-of-pocket price of treatment shifts these thresholds from L to L’ (a 
shift toward relatively low fertility patients) and from H to H’ (a shift toward relatively 
high fertility patients).
4  In both cases, the lower price results in utilization by patients 
with lower expected benefits, and utilization increases birth rates within each group.   
                                                 
4 This result is formalized in a theoretical model developed by Hamilton and McManus (2005).    8
While the effect of insurance coverage on the probability of a birth is similar for 
the marginal low and high fertility patient, the effect on the probability of a multiple birth 
differs dramatically.  In Figure 1, we plot the relationship between the probability of a 
multiple birth and fertility, with and without treatment, assuming that treatment has a 
constant, positive effect on the probability of a multiple birth, conditional on a birth.  
Under this assumption, holding embryo transfer practices constant, the probability of a 
multiple birth increases with fertility due primarily to its relationship with the probability 
of any birth.  Figure 1 demonstrates, however, that a portion of both high and low fertility 
patients undergoing infertility treatment in response to more generous insurance coverage 
would have given birth even in the absence of treatment.  Because multiple birth rates are 
high among those treated with ART, for this subset of women, treatment had no effect on 
whether they gave birth, but a large effect on their likelihood of a multiple birth.   
A key distinction between low and high fertility patients in this effect is the 
number of patients for whom it applies.  Because many high fertility patients would have 
given birth in the absence of treatment, insurance coverage may generate a relatively 
large increase in the number of multiple births relative to the increase in the number of 
births.  Among low fertility couples, in contrast, relatively few would have given birth in 
the absence of treatment.  As a result, the magnitude of the effect of treatment on the 
number of multiple births is likely to be smaller.  Thus, a potentially important form of 
moral hazard in response to insurance coverage for the treatment of infertility is an 
increase in multiple birth rates without a corresponding increase in birth rates among 
relatively high fertility patients.   9
  Table 1 provides a hypothetical numerical example to demonstrate this effect.  
High and low fertility patients differ in their probability of a birth without treatment (0.8 
versus 0.2).  We assume that treatment has the same effect on the probability of a birth (a 
10 percentage point increase) for both high and low fertility patients, and that, for both 
groups, infertility treatment increases the probability of a multiple birth conditional on a 
birth from 0.03 to 0.30.  The implication is that treatment has a larger (in absolute value) 
incremental effect on the probability of a multiple birth for high (0.246) than low (0.084) 
fertility patients.  In addition, the ratio of the incremental probability of a multiple birth to 
the incremental probability of a birth is much higher for high than low fertility patients.  
For low fertility patients, each incremental birth is associated with 0.8 incremental 
multiple births.  For high fertility patients, in contrast, each incremental birth is 
associated with 2.46 incremental multiple births. 
The assumptions underlying this stylized model are generally consistent with 
fertility rates and infertility treatment.  Rates of multiple births among those conceiving 
with ART are high - approximately 30% of ART deliveries are multiple deliveries, 
compared to approximately 3% of births in the population as a whole.  In our empirical 
work, we use female age as a proxy for fertility.  While female fertility declines 
significantly with age (Menken, Trussell et al. 1986), the proportion of births that are 
multiples varies relatively little with age, either with or without treatment.  Prior to the 
widespread use of infertility treatments, differences by age in rates of twin and triplet 
births were relatively small.  In 1980, rates of multiple births per 1,000 births were 20.5, 
23.5, 25.3, and 23.0 for women aged 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44, respectively 
(Martin and Park 1999).  In the case of ART, both birth rates and multiple birth rates   10
conditional on a birth decline with age, particularly after age 35 (CDC 2005).  These facts 
suggest that age is likely to be a good proxy for fertility in this context.    
 
Effects Insurance Coverage on Utilization along the Intensive Margin 
Patients seeking treatment for infertility face a variety of treatment alternatives, 
and generous insurance coverage may cause them to progress more rapidly from 
inexpensive to more expensive treatment options.  For example, artificial insemination 
(AI) is thought to be more cost-effective than IVF, which has a higher success rate but 
also a much higher cost, so that it would typically be optimal for patients to progress to 
IVF only after AI has failed (Van Voorhis, Sotovall et al. 1997).  Because patients with 
generous insurance coverage are protected from the out-of-pocket costs of IVF, they may 
progress to IVF more quickly.    
Other research, however, suggests insurance coverage of ART may lead to more  
efficient utilization of ART by influencing treatment patterns in ways that ultimately lead 
to lower rates of multiple births (Jain, Harlow et al. 2002).  Because multiple births are 
associated with low birth weight and other comorbidities for babies as well as greater risk 
of complications for mothers, many consider them a negative outcome of infertility 
treatment (Adashi, Barri et al. 2003).
5  Infants born as part of a multiple rather than a 
singleton birth are more likely to have low or very low birth weight (Schieve, S.F. et al. 
2002), and low birth weight is highly correlated with infant mortality as well as a variety 
                                                 
5 Although the evidence of complications associated with the use of ART, conditional on the number of 
births, is less conclusive, some studies point to the existence of negative effects on infant health.  
Population-based studies have found that infants conceived using reproductive technologies have worse 
health outcomes relative to those conceived naturally (Schieve et. al. 2002; Bitler 2006), and reviews of the 
medical literature conclude that the possibility that infants conceived using ART have an increased risk of 
birth defects relative to those conceived naturally cannot be ruled out (Hansen et. al 2005; Kurinzuk et. al. 
2006).   11
of longer-term poor health outcomes (Hack, Klein et al. 1995; CDC 2002).  Medical care 
costs are also higher for multiple than for singleton births.  A study conducted during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s found that the average per baby cost for a singleton delivery 
was $9,845 compared to $18,974 and $36,588 for twin and triplet deliveries, respectively 
(Callahan, J.E. et al. 1994).
6    
Due to the high per cycle cost of IVF, patients paying out-of-pocket face strong 
financial pressure to minimize the number of cycles.  Thus, they are willing to increase 
their chances of success at the increased risk of a multiple birth by transferring more 
embryos in a given cycle.  Patients with comprehensive health insurance covering 
multiple rounds may be more conservative in their decisions regarding embryo transfer 
since their out of pocket costs will be much lower for an additional cycle if the first is 
unsuccessful.
7 
 A potential mechanism for these positive efficiency effects is that insurance 
coverage of ART corrects a distortion in utilization created by differential coverage of 
complementary services.  Patients usually do not bear the high incremental medical care 
costs associated with the multiple births because they are generally covered by insurance.  
Thus, when they make embryo transfer decisions, they have no incentive to consider the 
incremental medical care costs associated with multiple births.  Insurance coverage of 
ART essentially corrects this distortion by subsidizing the cost of additional cycles of 
                                                 
6 Almond, Chay and Lee (2005), however, propose that these studies, which are largely cross-sectional 
analyses, overstate the magnitude of both the negative health consequences and medical care costs of low 
birth weight. 
7  In fact, some clinical evidence is consistent with this view, finding that fewer embryos are transferred per 
cycle and that the percentages of cycles resulting in live births and multiple births are lower in states with 
mandates for comprehensive health insurance coverage of ART than in those without (Reynolds, 2001; 
Jain, 2002).  However, it is not clear that these studies have adjusted well for the underlying characteristics 
of treated patients.  
   12
ART.  Alternatively, Hamilton and McManus (2005) propose that this effect can be 
attributed to intertemporal income effects that result in patients pursuing ART earlier due 
to the availability of greater wealth in subsequent periods, conditional on treatment in the 
earlier period.  Insurance essentially generates moral hazard by creating incentives for 
couples to pursue treatment earlier. 
 
Effects of Insurance Coverage on the Timing of Childbearing 
Insurance coverage of the treatment of infertility may also cause women to delay 
childbirth (Buckles 2006).  Women pursuing a career face a trade-off with respect to the 
timing of births.  While delaying child birth may lead to greater lifetime earnings, 
because female fecundity declines with age, it increases the risk of infertility.  By 
enabling women to bear children at older ages, effective infertility treatment reduces this 
risk.  Insurance coverage, in turn, reduces the medical care costs of expected future use of 
infertility treatment, creating stronger incentives for women to delay.     
 
III. Data  Sources 
We analyze separately data from two sources in order to examine the effects of 
the mandates.  Using population birth data, we examine birth rates, independent of 
treatment.  By not restricting our analyses to the treated population, we are able to test 
whether the incremental utilization associated with mandates indeed leads to incremental 
births or multiple births, essentially accounting for births that would likely have taken 
place in the absence of more generous insurance coverage.  Then, using clinic registry 
data, we examine utilization and outcomes among those treated with ART.  These data   13
allow us to assess the relationship between state mandate status and utilization of ART as 
well as outcomes among those treated.     
The source of population-level data on birth rates for the year 1981 to 1999 is the 
National Vital Statistics System of the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS 1981-
1999).  These data are abstracted from birth certificates filed each year in vital statistics 
offices of each state.  While the data include 100% of birth certificates for most states for 
the years of our study, for a small number of states during the earlier years, the data 
include only a 50% sample of birth certificates, and we adjust the total numbers 
accordingly.  From these data, we calculated the total number of births, singleton births, 
multiple births (any order), and triplet or higher order births in each state in each year by 
5-year age categories (25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, and 45-49).  We restrict our analyses 
to women age 25-49 because women in this age group represent the vast majority of ART 
cycles (CDC 2005).  We transform the birth data to represent deliveries, rather than 
births, because a delivery is the appropriate unit of analysis for most of our models.  
Because the use of infertility treatments is associated with high rates of multiple births, 
analyses that examine the number of infants born, as opposed to the number of women 
giving birth, may overstate the effects of the mandates on fertility rates.  We divide the 
number of births which were either twin or higher order by the relevant number of infants 
in order to estimate the number of deliveries for a given age group-state-year cell.
8   
We examine utilization and outcomes among those treated using registry data 
from the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies (SART).  In 1989, SART, an 
                                                 
8 Prior to 1989, quadruplets and quintuplets were characterized as triplet or higher order births.  For these 
years, we estimated the distribution of triplet, quadruplet, and quintuplet births based on the average of the 
national age-specific distribution for 1989 and 1990.  Because the numbers of quadruplet and quintuplet 
births are very small, we believe this estimate is unlikely to significantly bias our results.   14
affiliate of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), began a voluntary 
reporting system to collect clinic-level information about the utilization and outcome of 
ART services.  The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 federally 
mandated participation in the system for clinics providing ART.  The results are compiled 
annually by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and the first national report under 
this law was based on data collected for utilization in 1995.  We obtained hard copies of 
the 1989-1994 published reports from SART.  The clinic-level data from subsequent 
years are publicly available on the CDC website.  We use SART data from 1991 to 2001.  
We exclude the earlier years in order to restrict our analyses to the post-adoption period 
since the vast majority of states adopted mandates prior to 1989.     
The reports include the number of various types of ART cycles performed (in 
vitro fertilization (IVF), gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian 
transfer (ZIFT), transfer of cryopreserved embryos, and combinations of the above 
procedures) and the number of births and multiple births for each procedure.  Clinics do 
not report utilization of non-ART therapies such as artificial insemination or the use of 
ovulation inducing drugs without ART.  We identified the state of each clinic based on its 
ZIP code and calculated the numbers of cycles, live deliveries, and multiple live 
deliveries for each state in each year.  From this information, we calculated rates of 
cycles per 1,000 women age 25-44, live deliveries per cycle, and multiple deliveries per 
live delivery.
9  While the reports include information on cycles and outcomes by age, the 
age groupings vary over time.  Thus, prior to 1995, we are only able to analyze utilization 
                                                 
9 The SART reports include the number of multiple deliveries (twins and higher) for all cycles from 1990-
1994 and only for cycles involving fresh embryos from non-donor eggs for later years.  As a result, we 
analyze only multiple deliveries resulting from fresh cycles for all years.  In addition, in 1991 and 1992, the 
number of reported cycles is based on the number of retrievals as opposed to the number of cycles initiated.  
This will cause us to under-estimate the number of cycles in these years.   15
and outcomes aggregated across age groups.  From 1995 to 2001, we analyze separately 
women under 35 and 35 and over, although we limit our analyses to cycles using fresh 
eggs due to a change in the reporting of cycles using donor or frozen eggs in 1999. 
 
Insurance Mandates 
  We obtained information on which states had adopted insurance mandates from 
RESOLVE (www.resolve.org), a consumer organization for people experiencing 
infertility.  We then verified and expanded on this information by reviewing the actual 
legislation for each mandate.  Twelve states passed legislation mandating insurance 
coverage of ART between 1985 and 1999 (Table 2).
10  The conditions of the mandates, 
however, vary significantly across states based on the types of plans affected, the number 
and types of treatments covered, the cost-sharing associated with treatment, and the 
population to which the mandate applies.  Of course, firms that self-insure are exempt 
from mandates in all states.   
We classified the laws into three categories based on their likely effectiveness in 
changing treatment patterns.  We first differentiate between mandates that require 
insurance companies only to offer coverage for treatment and those that require insurance 
companies to cover infertility treatment.  It is not clear why mandating that insurers offer 
a policy but not mandating that consumers purchase the coverage would affect rates of 
coverage of the mandated benefit.  Insurers could have offered this type of policy at the 
chosen premium in the absences of a mandate.  While this treatment is consistent with 
most of the existing literature on benefit mandates that does not even consider offer-only 
                                                 
10 Louisiana and New Jersey each adopted a mandate and New York updated its mandate in 2001.    16
mandates (e.g. Gruber 1992), we explicitly test the effects of this type of mandate by 
analyzing them separately.   
Among mandates that require insurers to cover infertility treatment, we 
distinguish between those that require generous coverage of IVF from those that do not.  
We defined a “comprehensive” mandate (three states) as a requirement that insurance 
companies, including health maintenance organizations (HMOs), provide coverage for 
the cost of diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including ART of at least four cycles, 
with few exclusions on the population covered by the mandate.  A “limited” mandate 
(seven states) refers to mandating that insurers cover fewer than 4 cycles of IVF.  For the 
most part, these mandates require insurers to cover either a single cycle or exclude IVF 
from the mandated coverage.  An exception is the state of Maryland.  Although 
Maryland’s mandate required coverage of up to 3 cycles when it was adopted in 1985, 
coverage was limited to those with a 5-year history of infertility.
11  This restriction on the 
covered population, combined with fewer covered cycles, potentially makes the mandate 
less generous than those we define as comprehensive.  However, it is unclear how strictly 
the restriction based on pre-existing infertility was enforced.  In addition, the mandated 
three cycles of IVF is more generous that the coverage required in other states adopting 
limited mandates.  Due to this ambiguity, we test the sensitivity of our results to 
reclassifying Maryland’s mandate as comprehensive. The states adopting mandates, the 
year of adoption, and their classification are listed in Table 2.  We also note the specific 
restrictions on coverage that differentiate comprehensive from limited mandates. 
                                                 
11 In 1994, the mandate was extended to couples with a 2-year history of infertility as well as those with 
particular diagnoses with no waiting period.   17
A natural concern for our analysis is whether mandate passage was exogeneous 
with respect to demand for infertility treatment.  Existing papers in this literature provide 
strong evidence that this is not the case.  Hamilton and McManus (2005) find little 
difference between states adopting and those not adopting mandates with IVF-specific 
coverage regulations in demographic characteristics potentially reflecting demand for 
treatment, including female labor force participation rates, female educational attainment, 
average family size, and median household income.  Instead, they find substantive 
differences between the types of states in their regulatory environments as proxied by the 
extent to which they tend to mandate other types of services as well as the voting 
behavior of their citizens.  From this, they conclude that mandate adoption appears to 
reflect governing tastes rather than preferences for children or other life-style factors.  
Finally, they demonstrate that neither clinic size nor the number of clinics in a market 
varied by future state mandate status prior to the implementation of most mandates.  
Bitler (2006) demonstrates that trends in neither rates of twin births nor twin outcomes 
during the period prior to the adoption of mandates (1981-1984) differed by state 
mandate status.  These findings indicate that mandate adoption is unlikely to reflect state-
specific trends in demand for infertility treatment. 
 
Control variables 
We obtained data on the number of women in each state by age from 1981-2001, 
which are the basis of our per capita calculations, from the U.S. Census Bureau.  Data on 
time-varying characteristics of states, which we use as control variables in the empirical 
models, are from a variety of sources.  The estimate of per capita income is from the   18
regional economic accounts produced by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  We 
obtained annual state-level unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
From the Current Population Survey, we calculated state-year level female labor force 
participation rates, rates of education among women of child-bearing age, the distribution 
of the population based on family income relative to poverty, and rates of minorities and 
Hispanics.  Finally, using the County Business Patterns data produced by the U.S. Census 
Bureau, we calculate the proportion of workers in each state employed in small firms 
(<100 workers) in each year.     
 
IV.  Insurance Mandates and Population Delivery Rates 
In Figures 2-4, we present trends in rates of deliveries, multiple deliveries 
(including twin and higher order births), and triplet or higher order deliveries per women 
25-49 by whether the state ever adopted each type of mandate.  The vertical lines indicate 
the earliest and latest years in which mandates of any type were adopted. 
Although the baseline levels differ, there are not obvious differences in the trends 
for the total number of deliveries by state mandate status (Figure 2).
12  There are, 
however, more noticeable differences in trends in the rates of multiple births (Figure 3).  
In the post-mandate period, rates of multiple deliveries for women 25-49 increased more 
rapidly in states that adopted comprehensive mandates than in states that did not adopt 
mandates or that adopted offer-only or limited mandates.  These trends are even more 
pronounced for triplet and higher order deliveries (Figure 4).  The case of triplet and 
higher order births is notable because both the levels and trends in triplet or higher order 
                                                 
12 The peak in birth rates in 1991 is well documented in the literature and is driven primarily by birth rates 
for women 25 to 29.   19
deliveries were similar by state mandate status prior to the adoption of the mandates, but 
clearly diverged in the post-mandate period. 
We identify the effects of mandates by examining changes in delivery rates in 
states adopting laws before and after their implementation compared to changes in states 
that did not adopt mandates.  The following model provides the basic framework for our 
difference-in-difference estimates:    
  t i t i t i t i t i Y S X M y , , 2 . , ε δ γ β λ α + + + + + = − . (1) 
The data are aggregated to the state (i)-year (t) level.  Y represents a measure of 
the delivery rate among women of a particular 5-year age group, ranging from 25-49.  
We estimate all models separately by age group because we expect the effects of the 
mandates to differ by age group.  This specification also allows the effects of state 
characteristics and time trends to vary across age groups and avoids grouping populations 
with very different baseline fertility rates.  M is a series of indicators representing 
whether the state had adopted a comprehensive, limited, or offer-only mandate in place 
two years prior to the indicated year.  We lag the mandate indicators by two years for two 
reasons.  First, the lag between successful treatment and a birth is approximately nine 
months, indicating that the effect should be lagged by at least one year.  In addition, in 
preliminary analyses, we found that the mandates appear to affect birth rates with an 
additional year lag, potentially reflecting either lags in technology diffusion or the use of 
multiple cycles prior to achieving a live birth.  We include state (S) and year (Y) fixed 
effects as well as a set of time-varying state characteristics (X) described above.   Table 3 
includes definitions and summary statistics for the independent variables.   20
We estimate the model for each age group using two types of dependent variables.  
We first examine deliveries per capita to test the relationship between mandates and 
fertility rates.  We also examine rates of multiple deliveries (twin or higher order) and 
triplet or higher order deliveries per 1,000 deliveries to test whether mandates are 
associated with a shift in the distribution of deliveries toward multiples.  We estimate 
linear models using least squares, weighting by the size of the female population in each 
age group in a given state and year.  We allow for clustering by state when calculating the 
standard errors in order to obtain estimates that are unbiased by within-state serial 
correlation in the error terms (Bertrand, Duflo et al. 2004). 
The differences-in-differences estimates indicate that comprehensive mandates 
were associated with a decrease in delivery rates for women 25-29 and an increase in 
delivery rates for women 35-39 (Table 4 – Panel A for each age group).  The decrease of 
3.192 deliveries per 1,000 women represents a 3% decline for women 25-29 and the 
increase of 1.208 deliveries per 1,000 women represents a 4% increase for women 35-39.  
While the negative effect for younger women is consistent with a delay in child birth in 
response to more generous insurance coverage of infertility, we also find a similar 
negative effect in states adopting offer-only mandates, which are, in theory, less likely to 
effect insurance coverage and treatment patterns.  For women 30-34 and 40-44, the 
estimates of the effects of comprehensive mandates are positive, but not statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  For each group, the estimate represents a 1% increase 
in delivery rates, and the estimate borders on statistical significance for women 30-34 
(p=0.14)  We find no evidence that limited mandates affected delivery rates for any age 
group, and offer-only mandates are associated with delivery rates only for women 25-29.     21
For twin or higher order deliveries, the implementation of a comprehensive 
mandate led to a statistically significant increase in the proportion of deliveries that were 
multiples among women 30-34 and 35-39 (Table 4 – Panel B), and, for each of these age 
groups, the point estimate of the number of incremental multiple deliveries represents a 
10% increase in multiple delivery rates.  For women 40-44 and 45-49, the estimates are 
relatively large, representing a 16% and 17% increase, respectively, but imprecise.  We 
find no evidence that either limited or offer-only mandates increased rates of twin or 
higher-order deliveries among women of any age.   
The results for triplet or higher order multiple deliveries are similar to those for 
twin or higher order deliveries, although we find that, in addition to women 30-34 and 
35-39, comprehensive mandates increased rates of triplet or higher order deliveries 
among the youngest age group we study – women 25-29.  In general, the point estimates 
from these models represent a large percentage increase due to the relatively low rate of 
triplet or higher order deliveries in the population as a whole.  For example, a 
comprehensive mandate led to 0.304 incremental triplet or higher order deliveries per 
1,000 deliveries among women 30-34, representing a 54% increase.  Once again, these 
results provide no evidence that either limited or offer-only mandates were associated 
with higher rates of multiple deliveries. 
Our results for the effects of mandates on fertility rates differ somewhat from 
those of Schmidt (2007) who estimates that mandates increased first birth rates by 5% 
among women 35 and older but did not affect first births rates among younger women.  
One important methodological difference is that we do not restrict the measure of fertility   22
to first births.
13  In 2002, 43% of women who had one or more visits for medical help to 
get pregnant had already given birth at least once.
14  Because infertility treatments are 
often used for couples experiencing secondary infertility, restricting the analysis to first 
births may miss important effects of utilization on outcomes, particularly among older 
women.  In Table 5, we present the results of re-estimating our delivery rate models, 
restricting the dependent variable to first deliveries.  While we continue to find little 
evidence that either limited or offer-only mandates had an effect on delivery rates, the 
results for comprehensive mandates differ somewhat from those presented in Table 4.  In 
particular, we find the strongest evidence of an increase in first birth rates among women 
30-34.  For these women, the estimate of an incremental 1.303 deliveries per 1,000 
women represents a 7% increase in the first birth rate.  While the estimates for older 
women are large in percentage terms (8% and 9% for women 35-39 and 40-44, 
respectively), they are imprecisely estimated.  Comparing the results from Tables 4 and 5, 
we conclude that the effects of comprehensive mandates on delivery rates were not 
restricted to first deliveries and that they were larger for first deliveries for women 30-34 
and for subsequent deliveries for women 35-39.  
We also test the sensitivity of the results to re-classifying Maryland as having 
adopted a comprehensive, rather than a limited, mandate in 1985 (results are presented in 
Appendix Table 1).  Because few states adopted comprehensive versions of the laws and 
Maryland’s mandate was more comprehensive than most regulations that we classified as 
                                                 
13 Other differences include specifying the types of mandates into mutually exclusive groups, measuring 
fertility based on the number of women giving birth, rather than the number of infants born, a potentially 
important adjustment given the high rates of multiple births associated with infertility treatments, not log 
transforming the dependent variables, and not including state-specific quadratic time trends.  
14 Author’s calculations using data from the National Survey of Family Growth published by the CDC 
(2005).   23
limited (although less comprehensive than those we classified as comprehensive), this 
potentially represents an important test of the robustness of our results.  The results are 
not particularly sensitive to this reclassification.  Although the magnitudes of most of the 
estimates of the effects of comprehensive mandates are slightly smaller (with the 
exception of the effect of the comprehensive mandate on delivery rates for women 30-
34), they remain statistically significant.  In addition, we continue to find no evidence 
that limited mandates affected either fertility or multiple birth rates. 
In summary, we find that the effects of mandates on both fertility and multiple 
delivery rates were concentrated among states adopting the most comprehensive versions 
of the laws.  For states adopting comprehensive laws, mandates had the largest 
percentage effect on delivery rates for women 35-39 – a 4% increase for these women.  
For slightly younger (30-34) and older (40-44) women, the estimates indicate that 
mandates increased delivery rates by approximately 1%, although these estimates are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  For multiple deliveries, in contrast, we 
find strong evidence that mandates increased the proportion of deliveries that were 
multiples for women 30-34 and 35-39.  In the case of triplet or higher order deliveries, 
these effects extended to women 25-29.   
 
V.  Insurance Mandates and the Utilization and Outcomes of ART 
In this section, we examine the relationship between state mandate status and 
utilization and outcomes of ART.  These analyses supplement those from the birth data in 
three ways.  First, a relationship between state mandate status and utilization of ART 
provides important evidence of the mechanism underlying the effects we observe in the   24
population birth data.  Second, we directly test the relationship between state mandate 
status and changes in treatment patterns along the intensive margin by examining embryo 
transfer decisions.  Finally, we examine the relationship between state mandate status and 
the outcomes of ART patients.   
ART utilization increased dramatically from 1991-2001.  The number of cycles 
per 1,000 women of reproductive age (25-44) more than doubled from 0.79 to 1.83.
15  
During the same time period, births per cycle increased from 0.17 to 0.25 and multiples 
per birth increased from 0.31 to 0.38.  Cycles per capita, however, increased much more 
quickly in states that adopted comprehensive mandates than in states either without 
mandates or with other types of mandates (Figure 5).  Consistent with findings from the 
medical literature, deliveries per cycle (Figure 6) and multiples per ART delivery were 
lower in states with comprehensive mandates than in other states (Figure 7). 
We examine these trends using multivariate models.  Because the registry data do 
not span the period prior to the implementation of mandates, we are unable to control for 
characteristics of states that are fixed over time using state fixed effects.  Thus, these 
results are necessarily more tentative than those using the birth data.  The analyses are 
based on the following basic model: 
t i t i t i t i X Y M y , , , ε β δ λ α + + + + =  (3) 
Once again, we aggregate the data to the state(i)-year(t) level, and the dependent 
variables include cycles per 1,000 women, live deliveries per cycle, and multiple 
deliveries per live delivery.  M is a set of dummy variables indicating whether the state 
had a comprehensive, limited, or offer-only mandate in place.  In some models, we 
                                                 
15 We restrict the denominator to women 25-44 in this analysis because women 45-49 represent relatively 
few ART cycles.  While we were able to analyze this group separately using the birth data, we are unable to 
do so using the SART data.     25
include dummy variables indicating the year (Y) to control for trends in treatments and 
outcomes that were common across states over time.  Because utilization demonstrated a 
strong linear time trend, we also estimate models in which we instead include a linear 
time trend and the interaction of the trend with state mandate status.  This allows us to 
differentiate between a one-time shift in the level of outcome variables and a change in 
the rate of growth associated with the implementation of the mandate.  X includes time-
varying state-level characteristics that potentially affect treatments or outcomes.  Table 6 
includes summary statistics for the independent variables in these models. 
We estimate one set of models, pooling data for patients of all ages covering the 
period 1991-2001 as well as separate models by age group (under 35 and 35 and over) for 
the subset of the years for which we have consistent age breakdowns for the dependent 
variables (1995-2001).  We estimate the models using least squares, weighting by the 
corresponding denominator in the dependent variable.  We estimate the standard errors 
allowing for within-state correlation in the error terms. 
Comprehensive mandates were associated with an increase in the rate of growth, 
rather than a one-time shift, in utilization of ART relative to states not adopting 
mandates.  Although the point estimate of the effect of a comprehensive mandate is large 
in the model with only the main effects of the mandates (Table 7 – Column 1), it is not 
statistically significant.  However, when we interact a linear time trend with the mandate 
indicators, we find that the cycles per capita rose more quickly in states with 
comprehensive mandates than in states without mandates (Table 7 – Column 2).  We find 
no evidence that either limited or offer-only mandates were associated with greater 
utilization of ART.  When we re-estimate the model and restrict the sample to 1995-2001,   26
we obtain a similar result, although the effect of the comprehensive mandate is only 
weakly statistically significant (p=0.107), likely due to the smaller sample size (Table 7 – 
Column 3).  When estimating the model separately for women under 35 years and 35 and 
over, we find little evidence of differences in the effect of the comprehensive mandate on 
utilization for the two groups (Table 7 – Columns 5 and 6).  Although the point estimate 
is not statistically significant at conventional levels for the older group, the magnitude of 
the effect is similar to that for the younger group.  The estimates indicate that utilization 
of ART in states with comprehensive mandates is nearly double that of states without 
mandates.   
Consistent with research from the medical literature, we find that rates of 
deliveries per cycle and multiples per delivery were lower in states that adopted 
comprehensive mandates than in states without mandates.  The magnitudes of the effects 
are similar for women under 35 (Table 8 - Columns 1 and 2) and 35 and over (Table 8 - 
Columns 6 and 7), and the effects are large – representing an approximately 25% 
reduction in births per cycle and an eight percent reduction in multiples per birth.  
Although fewer embryos are transferred per cycles in states with comprehensive 
mandates for patients in both age groups, these effects are not statistically significant 
(Table 8 - Columns 3 and 8).  More importantly, we also find no evidence that 
differences in embryo transfer rates explain the lower rates of deliveries and multiple 
deliveries in state with comprehensive mandates.  When we control for the average 
number of embryos transferred (Table 8 – Columns 4, 5, 9 and 10), the point estimates of 
the effects of a comprehensive mandate on rates of deliveries per cycle and multiples 
deliveries per delivery are nearly identical to those from the models without the control.    27
While existing literature has attributed the relationship between mandates and lower rates 
of births per cycle and multiples per birth to the ability of insurance to reduce incentives 
to transfer more embryos in a given cycle (Jain, Harlow et al. 2002), our results imply 
that the relationship may have more to do with the composition of the treated population, 
which has typically been poorly controlled in previous work. 
While we find no evidence of an association between ART outcomes and state 
mandate status for states adopting limited mandates, we do find similar effects for states 
adopting offer-only mandates to those for states adopting comprehensive mandates.  
However, in the analysis of utilization, we found no evidence that utilization was greater 
in states with offer-only mandates, suggesting that these effects represent differences in 
the populations seeking treatment between the two types of states.   
 
VI. Discussion 
We find that mandates requiring insurers to provide comprehensive coverage of 
infertility treatments affect the utilization and outcomes of these services.  These effects, 
however, are concentrated within states adopting the most comprehensive versions of the 
laws – those that place fewer exclusions on the population to which the mandate applies 
and that require coverage of 3 or more cycles of IVF as well as less expensive treatments.  
We do not find evidence that more limited mandates affect either ART treatment patterns 
or population-level delivery or multiple delivery rates for women of any age.   
The effects of comprehensive mandates on population delivery rates are largest in 
percentage terms for women 35-39.  For this age group, comprehensive mandates 
resulted in an additional 1.208 deliveries per 1,000 women, a 4% increase.  For women   28
30-34, our estimates indicate that comprehensive mandates increased delivery rates by 
1% (p=0.14) and that this increase was concentrated among first births.  We do not find 
evidence that comprehensive mandates increased delivery rates among women of other 
ages, although for women 40-44, both the magnitude and standard error of the estimate 
are large.  
The estimates from the models of population delivery rates are consistent with 
those from the SART data.  In particular, by multiplying the point estimates of the effects 
of comprehensive mandates on delivery rates for women 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44 (Table 
4) by the number of women in each age group in comprehensive mandate states, we 
calculate that comprehensive mandates resulted in 1,867 incremental deliveries annually.   
From the SART data, we multiply the estimate of incremental annual utilization in states 
with comprehensive mandates (1.536 cycles per capita) by the number of women 25-44 
in these states to estimate the number of incremental cycles – 4,824.  Dividing the two, 
we obtain a ratio of incremental deliveries to incremental cycles of 0.39, close to the 
1996 rate of births per ART cycle of 0.23.  This calculation, however, assumes that all 
incremental births associated with the comprehensive mandate are due to ART.  If they 
are driven in part by increased utilization of other reproductive therapies such as 
ovulation-inducing drugs or artificial insemination, which seems likely, the estimated rate 
of incremental deliveries per ART cycle would be lower. 
While our results do not differ entirely from those of Schmidt (2007), who studies 
the effects of the mandates on rates of first birth among women of different ages using 
national natality data, they do provide a different picture of the effects of mandates on 
fertility rates.  First, while Schmidt finds that mandates increased first birth rates by 5%   29
among women 35 and older but did not affect first births rates among younger women, 
our analysis indicates that the largest effects were among women 35-39.  The percentage 
increases were smaller for both younger and older women.  In addition, our results 
indicate that limiting the analysis to first births may fail to capture important effects of on 
delivery rates.  In particular, we find that mandates had a larger effect on second or 
higher parity deliveries than on first deliveries for women 35-39.  This difference is 
potentially important when interpreting our findings because it is more consistent with an 
increase in the overall number of births than with a shift in the timing of births due to the 
implementation of a mandate.  Finally, Schmidt’s analysis provides no evidence on the 
corresponding effects on rates of multiple births among women of any age.    
Do younger women delay childbirth in response to mandated insurance coverage?  
While we find that delivery rates for women 25-29 declined after the adoption of 
comprehensive mandate in our main model, this result is sensitive to the classification of 
the Maryland law as comprehensive.  In addition, we find a similar effect for offer-only 
mandates, but not for limited mandates.  Thus, we view our findings on this issue as 
inconclusive because they are sensitive to model specification, although we note that 
other research using different methods and datasets has documented this type of effect 
(Buckles 2006).   
We also find that comprehensive mandates had relatively large effects on rates of 
multiple deliveries for women 25 to 39.  For women 30-34 and 35-39, comprehensive 
mandates are associated with a 10% increase in rates of multiple births.  The magnitudes 
of the effects of comprehensive mandates on rates of triplet or higher order deliveries 
range from a 29% increase for women 25-29 to a 54% increase for women 35-39.     30
While our results are not inconsistent with those of Bitler (2006) who documents 
an increase in the proportion of births that are twins among women 30 and over, they 
provide a more complete picture of the effects of mandates on rates of multiple births.  In 
particular, by not limiting our analysis to twin births, we find that comprehensive 
mandates increased rates of triplet and higher order births as well, and that this increase 
was not limited to women 30 and over, but extended to younger women aged 25-29.  
Because triplet and higher order births are both more costly and more risky than twin 
births, this effect has potentially important public health implications.    
Do comprehensive mandates increase the risk of multiple births among the 
relatively high fertility group - women who would have been likely to give birth even in 
the absence of treatment?  We find evidence of this type of effect among women 25-29 
and possibly among women 30-34.  Among the youngest women (25-29), we find no 
evidence that infertility mandates increased the number of deliveries although they did 
increase the rate of multiple deliveries.   Because comprehensive mandates resulted in an 
increase in both deliveries and multiple deliveries among women 30 to 34 and 35 to 39, 
whether they had this type of effect depends on the ratio of incremental multiple 
deliveries to incremental deliveries induced by the mandate.  We examine this in Table 9 
by re-estimating the model of multiple deliveries based on multiple deliveries per capita 
rather than per delivery and calculating the ratio of incremental multiple deliveries to 
incremental deliveries associated with a comprehensive mandate.  This type of effect 
would result in the ratio of incremental multiple deliveries to incremental deliveries in the 
population exceeding the ratio of multiple births among those treated with ART.     31
For women 35-39, we find that proportion of incremental deliveries associated 
with a comprehensive mandate that were multiples was 0.11 with a 95% confidence 
interval from 0.06 to 0.18.  This is somewhat lower than 30%, the approximate average 
rate of multiple births among those conceiving with ART, providing little evidence that 
the mandate led disproportionately to incremental utilization among those who would 
have given birth in the absence of treatment.  For women 30-34, in contrast, the ratio of 
the estimates is 0.18 with a 95% confidence interval from -0.412 to 1.589.  Although the 
imprecision of the estimates makes it possible that the true ratio is either higher or lower 
than 0.3, the potential for higher values suggests that it is possible that many women in 
this age group conceiving with ART may have delivered a baby in the absence of 
treatment. 
Did comprehensive mandates increase utilization among women for whom 
treatment was not successful?  The SART data provides evidence of this type of an effect.  
We find that utilization of ART was higher in states adopting comprehensive mandates 
for women both under 35 and 35 and over, and rates of deliveries per cycle and multiples 
per delivery were lower for both age groups.  This is consistent with an increase in 
utilization among poor prognosis patients.  These patients were less likely to conceive in 
a given cycle and may have produced fewer viable embryos to transfer, resulting in a 
fewer multiples per delivery. 
The effects of mandates on the composition of the population using ART as well 
as other infertility treatments may have important implications for evaluating the effects 
of infertility treatment on infant health.  In particular, we demonstrate that the marginal 
patient induced to use infertility treatment in response to a mandate is likely to differ   32
from the average patient using these treatments.  For example, Bitler (2006) finds that 
twins born in mandate states have slightly worse health outcomes than those born in non-
mandate states, indicating the existence of negative effects of either selection of patients 
into treatment or the use of infertility treatments on infant health.  While our analysis 
indicates that the women undergoing treatment for infertility in response to a benefit 
mandate may represent those from either the lower or higher end of the fertility 
distribution relative to those receiving treatment in the absence of a mandate, the 
relatively high fertility patients are those most likely to have a multiple birth.  Thus, the 
relatively small effects observed by Bilter may be representative of the most fertile 
portion of the distribution of patients receiving treatment.  Based on this reasoning, the 
negative effects on infant health among the treated population in the absence of a 
mandate could be larger.  
While the results from our analyses of utilization are necessarily more tentative 
due to the absence of data from the pre-mandate period, we do find evidence that 
utilization of ART grew more rapidly after the adoption of mandates for both younger 
and older women of reproductive age.  Consistent with other research, we find that births 
per cycle, multiples per birth, and the number of embryos transferred per cycle are lower 
in states with comprehensive insurance mandates than in states without mandates.  While 
other studies have attributed these relationships to less aggressive embryo transfer 
decisions caused by more generous insurance coverage, our results point to an alternative 
explanation – that, on net, comprehensive insurance coverage extended treatment to a 
relatively low fertility population for whom treatment was often not successful.  While 
we cannot rule out the possibility that in states with comprehensive mandates, patients   33
transferred fewer embryos per cycle – the estimate is negative, but imprecisely estimated 
- the lower rates of deliveries per cycle and multiples per delivery in mandated states is 
not explained by embryo transfer rates.  Thus, we conclude that these relationships are 
more likely to have been driven by a worse case mix in states adopting comprehensive 
mandates than more conservative embryo transfer decisions due to expanded insurance 
coverage. 
An important limitation of our study is that the data on utilization and outcomes 
of ART do not span the period prior to the adoption of most insurance mandates.  In 
addition, we are unable to assess the effects of mandates on treatments other than ART 
such as AI or ovulation-inducing drugs.  In the case of the models using the population 
birth data, the effects we observe may be driven by increased utilization of any type of 
infertility treatment, not just ART.  In addition, the mandates may have affected 
utilization of these other treatment in ways we do not observe.  While the existence of 
endogeneity in the passage of the laws represents is also possible, other researchers have 
documented that the states passing laws were very similar to those not passing laws in the 
time period proceeding the adoption of the laws (Hamilton and McManus 2005; Bitler 
2006), somewhat alleviating this concern.   
 
VII.  Conclusion 
In summary, we find that the adoption of mandates that insurers cover the 
treatment of infertility significantly increased the utilization of these treatments.  For 
many patients, the outcome was favorable in the sense that the incremental utilization 
resulted in a birth which likely would not have taken place in the absence of a mandate.    34
For others, however, the welfare implications are less clear.  While both relatively high 
and low fertility patients responded to the price reduction created by the mandate, the 
consequences of greater utilization of these technologies differed between the two 
groups.  For some high fertility patients seeking treatment in response to the availability 
of more generous insurance coverage, utilization led to a multiple rather than a singleton 
delivery.  This shift in the birth distribution toward multiples is important because 
multiple births are not only high cost, but are also high risk for both mothers and infants, 
primarily due to complications associated with low birth weight.  For low fertility 
women, in contrast, the adverse consequences of greater utilization were primarily in the 
form of unsuccessful outcomes.  For many of these couples, treatment was costly and did 
not ultimately lead to a live birth. 
These findings indicate that, even if infertility mandates increase welfare by 
reducing adverse selection in the coverage of infertility treatments, these benefits must be 
weighed against the significant moral hazard that they induce.  However, they also point 
to an alternative explanation for the absence of insurance coverage for infertility 
treatment.  Perhaps the moral hazard associated with generous insurance coverage itself 
reduces the extent to which insurers cover these services.  While our analyses cannot 
differentiate between these two explanations, their implications for policy differ.  If the 
market for insurance coverage for infertility treatment is limited due to adverse selection, 
a benefit mandate intended to solve this problem would need to be accompanied by 
mechanisms to minimize the resulting moral hazard.  These types of mechanisms may 
include restrictions on the population covered by the mandate and controls on utilization 
through either supply side mechanisms or demand side cost-sharing.  If the market for   35
coverage is limited primarily by the extent of moral hazard generated by more generous 
insurance coverage, in contrast, a benefit mandate will not solve this problem.  A more 
effective solution would be the development of more sophisticated mechanisms to target 
utilization to those for whom treatment the expected benefits of treatment exceed the 
expected costs.   36
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Figure 2:  Deliveries per 1,000 Women 25-49 by State Mandate Status 
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Figure 5:  ART Cycles per 1000 Women 25-44 by State Mandate Status 


























































































Triplet + Deliveries Women 25-49 by State Mandate Status  41
 
Figure 6:  ART Deliveries per Cycle by State Mandate Status 
 
 































































ART Births per Cycle by State Mandate  42





















Low  0.200 0.030 0.006   0.300 0.300 0.090   0.100 0.084 0.84
High 0.800 0.030 0.024   0.900 0.300 0.270   0.100 0.246 2.46
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Table 2:  Summary of the Timing and Type of Infertility Mandates Adopted by States 
 
State  Year of Adoption  Type  Restrictions 
Arkansas  1987  Limited  Insurers may limit the benefit to $15,000;  applies to non-HMOs only 
California 1989  Offer-only   
Connecticut 1989  Offer-only   
Hawaii 1987  Limited  Insurers  must  cover only one cycle of IVF 
Illinois  1991  Comprehensive  Insurers must cover up to 4 complete oocyte retrievals for a first birth 
and up to 2 complete oocyte retrievals for a second birth. 
Maryland 1985  Limited
1  Limited to 3 IVF attempts per live birth and $100,000 maximum 
lifetime benefit.  When the law was adopted, coverage was limited to 
patients with a 5-year history of infertility.  In 1994, this requirement 
was changed to limit coverage to couples with a 2-year history of 
infertility or infertility due to particular causes with no waiting period. 
Massachusetts 1987  Comprehensive   
Montana  1987  Limited  IVF excluded; applies to HMOs only 
New York  1990  Limited  IVF excluded; applies to non-HMOs only 
Ohio  1991  Limited  IVF excluded; applies to HMOs only 
Rhode Island  1989  Comprehensive   
Texas 1987  Offer-only   
West Virginia  1977  Limited  IVF excluded; applies to HMOs only 
 
1 For our main results, we classify Maryland’s law as limited due to its limitation to 3 cycles and its requirement of a 5-year history of 
infertility.  The law, however, is more comprehensive than those classified as limited in our analysis.  As a result, we present results 
re-estimating the models with Maryland classified as a comprehensive mandate.    44
 
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables in Models of Population Birth Rates 
        
N=969        
        
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Offer-only Mandate  0.113 0.317  0.000 1.000
Limited Mandate  0.082 0.274  0.000 1.000
Comprehensive Mandate  0.035 0.185  0.000 1.000
Female Labor Force Participation Rate  0.686 0.053  0.465 0.838
Years of Education Women 20-49:  12-15  0.650 0.047  0.411 0.779
Years of Education Women 20-49:  16-17  0.162 0.035  0.069 0.284
Years of Education Women 20-49:  18+  0.052 0.020  0.006 0.197
Per Capita Income (000s)  24.473 3.733  14.222 38.332
Family Income 2 to <4 times Poverty Level  0.346 0.036  0.213 0.466
Family Income 4+ times Poverty Level  0.317 0.066  0.123 0.579
Unemployment Rate  6.400 2.032  2.200 18.000
Proportion of Workers in Firms with < 100 Workers  0.553 0.046  0.431 0.846
Proportion of Population Minorities (Non-White)  0.164 0.085  0.008 0.714
Proportion of Population Hispanic  0.094 0.098  0.004 0.417
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Table 4 - The Effects of Benefit Mandates on Population Delivery Rates
Panel A
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Comprehensive Mandate -3.192* 0.999 1.208* 0.073 -0.019
[1.222] [0.663] [0.455] [0.128] [0.014]
Limited Mandate 0.317 -0.806 -0.074 0.009 0.015
[2.006] [1.467] [0.649] [0.128] [0.016]
Offer Only Mandate -2.362* 0.37 -0.419 -0.116 -0.003
[0.987] [0.739] [0.637] [0.231] [0.023]
Mean of dependent variable
1 110.69 74.87 29.64 5.517 0.262
Observations 969 969 969 969 969
R-squared 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.88
Panel B
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Comprehensive Mandate -0.018 1.504** 1.680* 2.512 7.043
[0.181] [0.359] [0.738] [2.053] [5.770]
Limited Mandate -0.038 -0.46 -0.292 -1.276 -1.322
[0.223] [0.474] [0.599] [0.857] [5.339]
Offer Only Mandate -0.115 -0.548 -0.475 0.831 3.418
[0.198] [0.478] [0.448] [1.156] [5.130]
Mean of dependent variable
1 12.29 15.2 17.58 16.139 41.664
Observations 969 969 969 969 963
R-squared 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.66 0.27
Panel C
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Comprehensive Mandate 0.083** 0.304** 0.292** 0.196 -0.097
[0.029] [0.059] [0.066] [0.151] [1.022]
Limited Mandate 0.027 -0.046 0.038 -0.208 -2.066
[0.026] [0.075] [0.078] [0.149] [1.380]
Offer Only Mandate -0.058* -0.088 0.057 0.075 -0.911
[0.027] [0.061] [0.084] [0.104] [1.568]
Mean of dependent variable
1 0.291 0.565 0.730 0.666 3.267
Observations 969 969 969 969 963
R-squared 0.58 0.75 0.66 0.41 0.27
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by state.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
1 Mean rate over all states and all years
Note:  Models include state and year fixed effects and time varying state level characteristics 
including female labor force participation rates, educational attainment, per capita income, 
distribution of the population by family income relative to poverty level, the unemployment rate, the 
minority rate, Hispanic ethnicity rate, and the proportion of workers employed in small firms.
 Deliveries per 1,000 women by age group
Twin or higher order deliveries per 1,000 deliveries by age group
Triplet or higher order deliveries per 1,000 deliveries by age group  46
 
Table 5 - The Effects of Benefit Mandates on First Delivery Rates
Dependent Variable:  First Deliveries per 1,000 women of indicated age group
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Comprehensive Mandate -0.546 1.303** 0.458 0.093 -0.002
[0.435] [0.339] [0.342] [0.108] [0.004]
Limited Mandate -0.909 -0.797+ -0.175 -0.04 0.002
[0.833] [0.468] [0.199] [0.035] [0.007]
Offer Only Mandate -0.542 0.228 -0.147 -0.021 0.000
[0.586] [0.401] [0.191] [0.042] [0.010]
Mean of dependent variable
1 40.097 19.641 6.123 1.022 0.043
Observations 969 969 969 969 969
R-squared 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.81
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by state.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
1 Mean rate over all states and all years
Note:  Models include state and year fixed effects and time varying state level characteristics 
including female labor force participation rates, educational attainment, per capita income, 
distribution of the population by family income relative to poverty level, the unemployment 
rate, the minority rate, Hispanic ethnicity rate, and the proportion of workers employed in 
small firms.
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Table 6:  SART Descriptive Statistics      
      
N=561      
      
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Comprehensive Mandate  0.07 0.26 0.00  1.00
Limited Mandate  0.16 0.36 0.00  1.00
Offer-only Mandate  0.21 0.41 0.00  1.00
Proportion of Women 30-34  0.26 0.01 0.21  0.28
Proportion of Women 30-34  0.26 0.01 0.22  0.30
Proportion of Women 40-44  0.24 0.01 0.20  0.31
Female Labor Force Participation Rate  0.71 0.04 0.55  0.84
Years of Education Women 20-49:  12-15  0.65 0.05 0.41  0.77
Years of Education Women 20-49:  16-17  0.17 0.03 0.08  0.28
Years of Education Women 20-49:  18+  0.06 0.02 0.01  0.20
Per Capita Income (000s)  25.51 3.31 16.76  37.64
Family Income 2 to <4 times Poverty Level  0.34 0.03 0.23  0.46
Family Income 4+ times Poverty Level  0.33 0.06 0.14  0.49
Proportion of Population Hispanic  0.11 0.11 0.00  0.41
Proportion of Population Minorities (Non-White)  0.17 0.08 0.01  0.70
Proportion of Workers in Firms with >= 100 
Workers 0.57 0.04 0.39  0.68
Unemployment Rate  6.00 1.53 2.50  11.40
Estimates weighted by the size of the female population 25-44       
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Table 7:  Relationship between State Mandate Status and Utilization of ART
25-44 25-44 25-44 <35 >=35
Comprehensive Mandate 1.29 -0.079 1.536 1.571* 1.545
[0.822] [0.555] [0.935] [0.691] [1.150]
Limited Mandate -0.127 -0.344 -0.125 -0.033 -0.142
[0.197] [0.251] [0.294] [0.236] [0.331]
Offer Only Mandate -0.079 -0.206 -0.091 -0.037 -0.035







Offer Only*Linear Year 0.027
[0.042]
Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Linear Year X
Mean of dependent variable
1 1.513 1.513 1.8 1.64 1.77
Observations 561 561 357 357 357
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.74 0.76
Standard errors adjusted for clustering by state.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
1991-2001 1995-2001
Cycles per 1,000 Women of Indicated Age
gq g y p p
All models include the control variables listed in Table 8 including the age distribution of the female 
population of reproductive age, female labor force participation rate, education, per capita income, 
distribution of family income based on poverty thresholds, the unemployment rates, the proportion of 
workers employed in large firms, proportion hispanic and proportion minority.  Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering by state.
1 Mean rate over all states and all years.  Age specific rates are lower than the pooled rate due to the inability 
to identify donor cycles by age in the later years.    49
Table 8:  Relationship between State Mandate Status and Outcomes of ART





































Comprehensive Mandate -0.071** -0.033** -0.125 -0.074** -0.031** -0.056** -0.027** -0.107 -0.056** -0.026**
[0.011] [0.010] [0.108] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.102] [0.008] [0.008]
Limited Mandate 0.012 0.009 -0.159+ 0.008 0.011 0.021** 0.01 0.004 0.021** 0.01
[0.012] [0.007] [0.080] [0.012] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.092] [0.007] [0.008]
Offer Only Mandate -0.039* -0.025+ -0.047 -0.040** -0.025+ -0.027* -0.031* -0.124 -0.026* -0.030*
[0.015] [0.013] [0.142] [0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.012] [0.175] [0.011] [0.012]
Embryo Transfer Rate -0.023* 0.017 0.002 0.008
[0.011] [0.011] [0.002] [0.005]
Mean of dependent variable
1 0.306 0.408 3.191 0.306 0.408 0.195 0.314 3.234 0.195 0.314
Observations 324 322 324 324 322 324 323 324 324 323
R-squared 0.55 0.24 0.78 0.57 0.25 0.57 0.15 0.41 0.57 0.16
Standard errors adjusted for clustering by state.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Women Under 35 Women 35 and Over
Note:  All models include controls for the age distribution of the female population of reproductive age, female labor force participation rate, 
education, per capita income, distribution of family income based on poverty thresholds, the unemployment rate, the proportion of workers 
employed in large firms, proportion hispanic and proportion minority.
1 Mean rate over all states and all years.      50
Table 9:  The Ratio of Incremental Multple Deliveries per Incremental Delivery
30-34 35-39
Incremental deliveries per 1000
1 0.999 1.208
(-0.333 , 2.332) (0.294 , 2.121)
Incremental multiple deliveries per 1000
2 0.183 0.116
(0.103, 0.264) (0.042 , 0.190)
Incremental multiple deliveries per incremental delivery
3 0.184 0.096
(-0.412 ,1.589) (0.056 , 0.168)
1  Point estimates and 95 percent confidence internvals of the effect of a comprehensive 
mandate on deliveries per 1,000 women of indicated age.  These estimates are identical to 
those presented in Table 4.
2  Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals of the effect of a comprehensive 
mandate on multiple deliveries per 1,000 women of indicated age.  These estimates are 
derived from models identical to those used to calculate incremental deliveries with the 
exception of the change in the dependent variable from deliveries (any order) to multiple 
deliveries.
3  Estimates of the ratio of incremental multiple deliveries to incremental deliveries.  95 
percent confidence intervals are estimated using the bootstrap method.  
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Appendix Table 1 - The Effects of Benefit Mandates on Population Delivery Rates 
(reclassifying Maryland as having a comprehensive mandate)
Panel A
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Comprehensive Mandate -1.323 1.013+ 1.099* 0.08 -0.023+
[1.715] [0.599] [0.461] [0.112] [0.012]
Limited Mandate -0.688 -1.012 -0.126 -0.002 0.02
[2.184] [1.575] [0.682] [0.128] [0.014]
Offer Only Mandate -2.136* 0.321 -0.46 -0.117 -0.003
[1.059] [0.750] [0.636] [0.229] [0.023]
Mean of dependent variable
1 110.69 74.87 29.64 5.517 0.262
Observations 969 969 969 969 969
R-squared 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.88
Panel B
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Comprehensive Mandate 0.032 1.105* 1.381* 1.922 6.381
[0.176] [0.504] [0.640] [1.791] [5.558]
Limited Mandate -0.077 -0.344 -0.228 -1.102 -1.344
[0.239] [0.470] [0.609] [0.807] [5.215]
Offer Only Mandate -0.112 -0.621 -0.532 0.74 3.223
[0.197] [0.490] [0.466] [1.175] [5.164]
Mean of dependent variable
1 12.29 15.2 17.58 16.139 41.664
Observations 969 969 969 969 963
R-squared 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.66 0.27
Panel C
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Comprehensive Mandate 0.075* 0.249** 0.238** 0.145 -0.586
[0.029] [0.073] [0.077] [0.141] [1.136]
Limited Mandate 0.027 -0.037 0.058 -0.198 -1.858
[0.026] [0.075] [0.078] [0.148] [1.416]
Offer Only Mandate -0.060* -0.100 0.049 0.066 -0.968
[0.026] [0.063] [0.086] [0.105] [1.581]
Mean of dependent variable
1 0.291 0.565 0.730 0.666 3.267
Observations 969 969 969 969 963
R-squared 0.58 0.75 0.66 0.41 0.27
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by state.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
1 Mean rate over all states and all years
 Deliveries per 1,000 women by age group
Twin or higher order deliveries per 1,000 deliveries by age group
Triplet or higher order deliveries per 1,000 deliveries by age group
Note:  Models include state and year fixed effects and time varying state level characteristics including 
female labor force participation rates, educational attainment, per capita income, distribution of the 
population by family income relative to poverty level, the unemployment rate, the minority rate, 
Hispanic ethnicity rate, and the proportion of workers employed in small firms.
 
 